

## Response from the Association for Progressive Communications to the CSTD Working Group on Enhanced Cooperation Questionnaire, 10 September 2013

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### 1. Which stakeholder category do you belong to?

Non-Government, Civil society, with ECOSOC consultative status since 1995

### 2. What do you think is the significance, purpose and scope of enhanced cooperation (EC) as per the Tunis Agenda?

**a) Significance:** In 2005 few governments had any involvement in the management of the internet: at global, regional or national level. Most agreed that the internet was important, and that governments should have a role. Many were not satisfied with existing 'internet governance arrangements' but could not reach consensus on how to proceed. Dissatisfaction centred on the fact that some internet governance bodies like ICANN and IANA were not fully internationalised, being located in the United States and, in some respects, accountable to the US government. While on the one hand internet management was distributed, power and influence of this management was concentrated in the 'global north'. Some member states also felt there were public policy issues without a clear home inside the existing international system.

"Enhanced cooperation"(EC) implies that the existing modes of cooperation were felt to be inadequate. But this can be read in different ways. We believe there are two readings which are significant in today's context:

- i. Member states still had some discomfort with the WSIS principle that the management of the internet needed to involve 'all stakeholders'. Some were concerned because they feared this inclusion would enable business to have too much influence over 'public' internet policy-making. Others were not comfortable with the closer involvement in decision-making this would give civil society (CS). Put this discomfort against the backdrop of most governments at the time having little involvement in internet management, add the power play resulting from the US's historically privileged role, and you end up with a mix of concern, uncertainty and tension – not conducive to resolution. The CSTD WG could reflect on how this has changed since 2005.
- ii. "Cooperation" is a positive term. The frequent mention in the Tunis Agenda of enhancing cooperation coincides with mention of the importance of involving all stakeholders. It is our view that limiting the discussion of enhancing, or improving cooperation, to the role of governments would be a lost opportunity.

**b) Purpose:** Our view is that *the purpose of EC is to improve and democratise the governance of the internet at all levels*, not simply to establish greater influence for sovereign states.

Multi-stakeholder participation is not an end in itself, it is a means to achieve the end of inclusive democratic internet governance that enables the internet to be a force, to quote from the Geneva Declaration, for "the attainment of a more peaceful, just and prosperous world." (paragraph 2). Improving multi-stakeholder processes, and thereby, the outcomes of those processes, cannot take place by only looking at the role of governments.

**c) Scope:** We support the Best Bits<sup>1</sup> submission that the scope of EC "should include the development of globally-applicable principles on public policy issues" (para 70) and "also could envisage creation of a suitable framework or mechanisms, where justified" (para 61), but does not envision the involvement of governments "in the day-to-day technical and operational matters, that do not impact on international public policy issues" (para 69).

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<sup>1</sup> Best Bits is a coalition of CS organisations that submitted a response to the CSTD WG questionnaire. APC has endorsed this response which is available at <http://bestbits.net/ec/>

Although it emphasises what EC means for governments (who, after all, were the only stakeholder group required to agree to the final text), the Tunis Agenda does not suggest that EC is solely for governments. In paragraph 69, EC is suggested as a mechanism to “enable” governments to carry out their roles and responsibilities. To “enable” does not mean that EC is for governments alone. Indeed the scope of EC also encompasses all relevant stakeholders as per para. 70 (“organisations responsible for essential tasks”) and the process towards EC will involve “all stakeholders” as stated in para. 71.<sup>2</sup>

**3. To what extent has or has not EC been implemented? Please use the space below to explain and to provide examples to support your answer.**

Management of the internet has evolved since 2005. The IGF is an established process for internet policy dialogue and has a mandate to be more outcome-oriented from ECOSOC via the CSTD WG on IGF improvements. More countries address internet policy issues at national level. The ITU, UNESCO, UNCTAD and many other UN bodies address internet-related policy issues, such as the Human Rights Council which deals with human rights on the internet. Regional governmental bodies like the European Commission and the African Union Commission address a wide range of internet policy issues.

Individual institutions have also evolved. ICANN, for example has more government participation, improved transparency and accountability mechanisms, and looser ties with the US government. In terms of power and influence however, CS still does not have much of either, in spite of being an active participant in ICANN processes. ICANN can be seen as an example of a process where the overall structure is multi-stakeholder, but power is mostly to be shared, and contested, between business and government.

There is clearly a vibrant and diverse internet governance ecosystem at work. But it cannot be said that all parts of it are adequately inclusive, transparent and accountable. Assessing the extent to which EC has taken place involves looking at participation, power and influence in both the ecosystem and its components. This is neither a trivial exercise, nor a once-off exercise.

As we said above we see the purpose of enhancing cooperation as improving and democratising the governance of the internet, *at all levels*. Therefore its implementation is continuous, and needs to be evaluated on an ongoing basis throughout the internet governance ecosystem.

**4. What are the relevant international public policy issues pertaining to the Internet?**

Mapping of internet related public policy issues reveals a complex and vast ecosystem of public policy issues, mechanisms for policy making and forums for standards making and dialogue. (David Souter, “Mapping internet rights and freedom of expression: Global Information Society Watch, 2011, page 55)<sup>3</sup>. Rather than present a list, we would like to point out that public policy issues that relate to the internet are not finite. They will emerge and change over time. Some will stand out as priorities at certain times, as does at present, surveillance. What is important to point out is the diversity of these issues, and therefore it would not be feasible to centralise decision-making about them. Consider, for example, two issues that have been discussed in the last year: taxation of global internet companies, and online freedom of expression.

The internet does not exist in a parallel dimension. It is part of social, economic, cultural, personal and political life. A more appropriate manner for phrasing this question would be: What relevant international public policy issues do NOT pertain to the internet in any way?

**5. What are the roles and responsibilities of the different stakeholders, including governments, in implementation of the various aspects of EC?**

Our comments will focus on the roles of CS and government. This is not to say that other groups do not also have a significant role to play. EC cannot be achieved through

<sup>2</sup> <http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.html>

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.giswatch.org/mapping-democracy/freedom-expression/mapping-internet-rights-and-freedom-expression>

implementation by one stakeholder alone. Cooperation is needed both within and between all stakeholder groups that have an interest in internet governance. So is debate. CS participation in particular needs to be strengthened in order to bring its power and influence in line with that of business and government.

The Tunis Agenda para 35 (c) description of the role of CS has having "...played an important role on internet matters, especially at the community level", is inadequate.<sup>4</sup> As stated in the CS Declaration at the conclusion of the first phase of the WSIS in Geneva in December 2003: "The full realisation of a just information society requires the full participation of CS in its conception, implementation, and operation".<sup>5</sup>

CS has a key role to protect the interests of marginalised and disadvantaged groups, and to incorporate rights and development approaches into internet policy matters. This role is especially important as one of the counterweights to the power of government and business; CS can support, critically analyse, and positively challenge the accountability and transparency of government and business actions.

Modalities of participation should recognise that CS represents the most diverse range of groups, including the least powerful sectors of society. CS, particularly from the global South, therefore needs to be given greater voice and influence at global, regional and national level. Governments should take practical steps towards enhanced cooperation with CS by consistently inviting CS representatives onto official delegations at global internet related conferences, and involving them in developing policy positions in response to the agendas of these events.

Governments have special responsibilities under international human rights law as bearers of duties to respect, protect and promote human rights. They also have in our view, the responsibility to protect and promote the public interest, which requires them to:

- i. Consult widely and be participative in the development of local internet policy;
- ii. Faithfully represent the diversity of CS views, even when these may differ from their own;
- iii. Respect the role and responsibility of CS to challenge governments, including in international fora;
- iv. Convene and support inclusive multi-stakeholder internet governance processes at national level;
- v. Bring sufficient political will to bear so that cooperation emerging from these processes does not stagnate;
- vi. Establish transparency and accountability mechanisms to enable public scrutiny of their decisions and positions on internet governance;
- vii. Take steps to ensure that businesses meet human rights standards (for example, in line with the United Nations guidelines on human rights and business);

In general we urge the WG to recognise that the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders in internet governance cannot be fixed. They will vary depending on the issue, process or task at hand.

## **6. How should EC be implemented to enable governments, on an equal footing, to carry out their roles and responsibilities in international public policy issues pertaining to the Internet?**

Governments should recognise that public policy, including internet public policy, cannot be implemented by governments alone and that implementation will be more effective if these

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<sup>4</sup> Nor is it consistent with Secretary General Ban Ki-moon's 2009 statement at the World Economic Forum in Davos: "Our times demand a new definition of leadership - global leadership. They demand a new constellation of international cooperation - governments, CS and the private sector, working together for a collective global good."

<sup>5</sup> <http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/geneva/civil-society-declaration.pdf>

stakeholders are involved in the development of policy in the first place. It therefore follows that EC cannot be implemented by any one stakeholder group on its own.

Nevertheless, there are certain actions which governments and inter-governmental forums can take which will improve how they interact with one another. These include:

- i. Rotation of responsibility for taking the lead in implementing EC and in monitoring such implementation
- ii. Ensuring that developing countries have equal leadership with developed countries in such efforts;
- iii. Supporting efforts to improve the theory, practice and principles that frame multi-stakeholder internet governance – a process which we believe belongs in the IGF;
- iv. Recognition that the internet is a global resource, of benefit to all humanity and that governance of the internet should therefore not be reduced to haggling or horse trading based on narrow national interests or geopolitical conflicts, but based on international agreements such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenants on civil and political and on economic, cultural and social rights;
- v. Taking measures to consider, identify and mitigate conflicts of interest when states that are 'home' to global internet-related companies are also involved in 'multi-stakeholder' decision-making;
- vi. Developing an agreed code of good practice by which governments can assess their own performance in relation to EC (such as the joint initiative of APC, the UN Economic Council of Europe and the Council of Europe <https://www.apc.org/en/node/11199>);
- vii. Active participation in global, regional and national IGFs and in other internet governance mechanisms. The burden (which can be substantial) of such participation can be lightened by government collaborating with other stakeholder groups;
- viii. Upholding transparency and multi-lateral agreements, and avoiding internet-related agreements that undermine the principle of governments operating on an equal footing. Examples of the type of agreement that should be avoided are ACTA, and more recently, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): trade agreements which are not publicly negotiated within the international system;
- ix. Ensuring transparency and procedural fairness, access to information and participation in all internet governance discussions and processes, nationally, regionally and globally;
- x. Ensuring that the principle of 'equitable footing' applies inside governmental internet governance mechanisms and processes with regard to linguistic diversity, the full and equal participation of women, and the participation of small/large, rich and poor countries/regions.

## **7. How can EC enable other stakeholders to carry out their roles and responsibilities?**

As we see the purpose of EC to be to improve and democratise the governance of the internet it cannot exclusively involve, or be driven by, governments. However leadership from government is critical, and the more inclusive this leadership, the better. The challenge in multi-stakeholder policy processes (as in all policy processes) is how to ensure that such processes remain centred on the broadest possible public interest. EC needs to help meet this challenge.

A key benefit of the multi-stakeholder model of internet public policy-making is that the sum of all stakeholder inputs can be greater than their parts. The investment of time and resources in opening a policy process to the input of a multiplicity of voices and interest groups, from the

most powerful to the least powerful, can lead to the outcome of the process not just being as fair as possible, it can also make it more sustainable. Actors who need to comply with or implement policy are much more likely to do so if they were part of its design. For EC to enable other stakeholders to carry out their roles and responsibilities it is necessary for all stakeholders, including governments to:

- i. Work towards agreeing on public interest principles and modalities for policy-making and participation which take account of, and manage, conflict of interest (particularly important when industry is involved in policy development processes);
- ii. Participate actively in discussions on principles of internet governance, and principles for multi-stakeholder cooperation (discussions at the IGF and elsewhere);
- iii. Utilise the unique opportunity provided by the IGF as an established forum of internet policy dialogue to reach agreement, in the context of the IGF, on such principles and modalities by 2016;
- iv. Facilitate and encourage the establishment of inclusive and effective multi-stakeholder processes at national level, based on the WSIS principles, and use these as a basis for orienting their country's participation in regional and global fora;
- v. Use the existing decentralised nature of the IGF process to enable more stakeholders, particularly at regional and local level, to be involved; and to serve as a model for policy-making processes;
- vi. Democratise existing processes by addressing barriers that prevent people and organisations that are affected by their outcomes from participation. Such barriers include gender, financial resources, language, experience, knowledge and distance. Existing efforts to address these, including remote participation, need to be strengthened;
- vii. Establish a culture of respect for one another in order to facilitate effective cooperation, but not to do this at the expense of recognising that there are different interests among stakeholders, and that these need to be debated vigorously.

## **8. What are the most appropriate mechanisms to fully implement EC as recognized in the Tunis Agenda, including on international public policy issues pertaining to the Internet and public policy issues associated with coordination and management of critical Internet resources?**

Some argue that EC can only be achieved by establishing more centralised coordination and oversight of this ecosystem. We would argue the opposite.

There has been a blossoming of mechanisms in which EC can take place since the Tunis Agenda was agreed<sup>6</sup>. This includes both new and existing mechanisms. But importantly, it also includes mechanisms that are not 'internet-specific'. David Souter points out that the internet policy environment "includes diverse institutions from both mainstream public policy and internet governance contexts." (Global Information Society Watch 2011 p 56). While this growing ecosystem risks being overly complex and opaque, it also increases depth, diversity, and the opportunity for participation.

Any mechanism, regardless of its modalities or form, will be more effective in enhancing cooperation if those participating in it are able to participate with confidence. We believe an important component of the internet governance ecosystem is for different stakeholder groups to have their own spaces, to deliberate among one another. The extent to which the growing

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<sup>6</sup> The Tunis Agenda identifies at least 16 UN agencies as appropriate for involvement in implementation or facilitation of the Geneva Plan of Action (see Annex to WSIS Outcome Documents, December 2005, p 96). Additional UN mechanisms that have focused on internet related public policy issues since the WSIS and in which nongovernmental organisations have had a role include the UN Human Rights Council; the Human Rights Committee (General Comment 34); Commission on the Status of Women and the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women.

number of individuals, institutions, networks and communities that have a stake in internet policy have access to such spaces, varies.

We would argue that the existing intergovernmental system, at global and regional level, provides governments with ample opportunity for such deliberation. The challenge is to give greater voice to developing country governments in such deliberation, and to develop a rights-based approach to internet policy. Building new formal mechanisms will only increase this challenge.

CS is the most heterogeneous sector involved in internet governance and has the fewest resources. CSOs also have to overcome the challenge posed by the diversity of experiences and views in the sector; particularly difficult as they have few opportunities for effective deliberations among one another.

Rather than create new policy-making or oversight mechanisms we recommend the following:

- i. Strengthening the meaningful participation of all stakeholders in existing mechanisms - particularly developing country stakeholders. There is a disturbing trend towards 'tokenistic' inclusion of non-governmental and developing country stakeholders in multi-stakeholder processes, represented by, for example, the ritual of all stakeholders and regions being 'represented' in opening and closing ceremonies;
- ii. CS engagement to be empowered within existing mechanisms at national, regional and global levels.<sup>7</sup> CS's heterogeneity must be recognised as a strength and existing mechanisms must ensure that modalities for participation provide ample space for the diversity of voices in CS to be heard;
- iii. Existing mechanisms to commit to increasing transparency and accountability to the public-interest (and if this interest is not clear, to be willing to identify it in the context of their work);
- iv. Periodic evaluation of the extent to which such mechanisms actively demonstrate EC - with this to be understood as improved and democratised public-interest oriented governance;
- v. Existing mechanisms with power and resources such as ICANN to avoid mission creep. ICANN itself has become increasingly engaged in other internet governance issues. While this collaboration is positive, it risks blurring the clear demarcation between its narrow technical coordination role and other more substantive internet related public policy issues which it is not equipped or mandated to address;
- vi. Establishing information clearing houses and policy observatories such as the European Commission's proposed Global Internet Policy Observatory<sup>8</sup> and ensuring that these work in collaboration with the IGF process;
- vii. Capacity building initiatives.

In some instances there might be a need for a new mechanism, for example, to address and prevent the rights violations that result from mass surveillance by governments, working with corporations. We would still recommend first exploring whether existing human rights mechanisms cannot play the needed role before opting for the creation of new mechanisms.

## **9. What is the possible relationship between EC and the IGF?**

We interpret the Tunis Agenda as clearly including the IGF as an important element in achieving EC. We regret that the IGF took longer than anticipated to address the matter explicitly. But we note that since it has taken it on board, progress has been substantial. At the

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<sup>7</sup> Even in a body such as ICANN where much attention has been given to improving participation, results are mixed. Government voices within ICANN are increasingly empowered, but, they often exercise this power by giving advice directly to the board, rather than by participating in substantive policy discussions within ICANN. And CS groups are not represented evenly compared to private sector groups (including commercial, business and intellectual property constituencies).

<sup>8</sup> <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/commission-plans-guide-through-global-internet-policy-labyrinth>

2013 IGF there will be main sessions on operationalising the role of government in IG; principles for multi-stakeholder participation; and principles for internet governance.

We believe the IGF is the ideal space for fostering, analysing, and measuring EC among all stakeholders. It does not have to be the only place where this happens, but its relationship to the UN positions it extremely well to play this role. However, for the IGF to fulfil its potential it needs to be adequately resourced.

We propose that the CSTD WG on EC works actively with the IGF (e.g. by engaging regional and global IGFs). We propose that for the longer term, such a working group be established within the IGF framework, in close association with the CSTD, to review progress in democratising internet governance. An intersessional thematic IGF could be convened in between global IGF's to facilitate this working group's tasks which should be to:

- i. Assess progress in implementing EC/democratising internet governance;
- ii. Ensure that by the end of the IGF's current mandate in 2015 some consensus is reached on basic principles and modalities for democratising internet governance;
- iii. Achieve consensus on a monitoring framework (or code of good practice) that can be used for both self, peer and bottom-up assessment of the extent to which mechanisms and processes are effectively democratising and acting in the public interest.

## **10. How can the role of developing countries be made more effective in global Internet governance?**

"Developing countries are excluded at so many different levels, and they self-exclude, so addressing this problem is not at all trivial. The way in which Internet governance for development (IG4D) has been conceived and addressed in the IGF and in other global spaces is not helpful. It is narrow, and top down, and often does not go beyond affordable access issues. Clarifying the role of governments in Internet governance (see questions 5, 6, 7 and 11) is the first step. Developing country governments must be involved in this discussion otherwise they will not buy into its outcomes. Another necessary step is to foster more engagement with Internet governance issues at the national level in developing countries. In the way that developing countries have made an impact on global issues such as trade justice for, example, so too they could in Internet governance. The issues are debated at national level by the labour movement, local business, social justice groups etc. and this both pressurises governments and informs governments (not always in the desired way) at the global level. Critical thinking needs to be applied at national and regional level, with involvement of non-governmental stakeholders for more effective developing country representation at global level. And vice versa. Global Internet governance processes need to report and feed into national processes. In short, making developing countries (government and other stakeholders) play a more effective role in global Internet governance requires mechanisms at national and regional level as well as a process of democratisation at the global level." (From the Best Bits statement.)

Regional integration initiatives in regions such as LAC and Africa are also a way to to develop coordinated efforts in order to influence global decision-making more effectively; but they need to consistently include all stakeholders. It is also important to ensure continuation and strengthening of initiatives that build capacities of stakeholders in developing countries such as the African Internet Governance School<sup>9</sup>, among others. While it is necessary to bridge the capacity gap (at the levels of knowledge, expertise and financial resources) for developing countries to be engaged in global IG, it should also be recognised that this gap is not consistent: capacity does exist in developing countries, among all stakeholders.

## **11. What barriers remain for all stakeholders to fully participate in their respective roles in global Internet governance? How can these barriers best be overcome?**

This has been addressed already in previous questions (notably 6, 7 and 8). Barriers that stand out include:

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<sup>9</sup> <http://african-ig-school.events.apc.org/>

- i. The absence of common principles for internet governance at both substantive and procedural levels. There is not even a common understanding on what the internet is from an economic or legal perspective;
- ii. Lack of maturity and differentiation on the conceptual approach to internet governance. There is, for example, no clear distinction between governance, policy and regulation;
- iii. Geopolitical arrangements among states, and interventions by states in global policy processes that appear to be aimed at protecting the specific business or political interests rather than reflect a broader mandate from all of their citizens;
- iv. Unequal distribution of power among governments in global internet governance spaces. Some are simply more powerful than others, and often decisions are shaped by these power configurations rather than by a desire to achieve the best possible public interest outcomes;
- v. Limited financial resources, time, capacity and knowledge operate as barriers to the participation in the internet governance ecosystem by CS, small/medium size business and governments from developing countries;
- vi. Diversity, different political and cultural backgrounds and traditions, different understandings about the role of governments, and different approaches by governments to inclusive policy processes;
- vii. Uncertainty about how soft power, as exercised by e.g. the IGF, influences global internet policies, and whether it is worth investing in;
- viii. Uneven knowledge and confidence. Internet governance comes across as technical and complex. There needs to be more articulation of IG issues in relation to broader public policy issues and how they touch on people's day to day use of the internet.

**12. What actions are needed to promote effective participation of all marginalised people in the global information society?**

- i. Bottom-up strategies that use local expertise and focuses on: telecoms and internet infrastructure; enabling policies; incentives for the private sector, and education for all;
- i. Reduce the cost of internet access in developing countries;
- ii. Capacity-building for marginalized groups to access online spaces, public information and essential services in a safe and inclusive way;
- iii. Work with marginalized communities to develop local content in their own language, that meet their needs and tell their stories;
- iv. Capacity-building and campaigns for internet users to understand the barriers to participation by marginalized groups in the information society, including online threats and discrimination;
- v. Facilitate participation of marginalized group in IG forums by ensuring their issues are on the agendas of those forums;
- vi. Measuring the inclusion of women in internet governance spaces and taking concrete action if the results indicated unequal participation; and,
- vii. Establishment of national multistakeholder forums and processes for dealing with IG and internet policy issues, and ensuring that they include marginalised voices.

**13. How can EC address key issues toward global, social and economic development?**

By helping to ensure that stakeholders from all sectors reach agreement on a common vision and goals for ICT supported socio-economic development, and by respecting that they can all contribute to meeting these goals.



Also important is managing conflicts of interest, and putting human rights and the public interest first.

#### **14. What is the role of various stakeholders in promoting the development of local language content?**

Governments need to provide leadership to ensure that policies are in place to:

- i. Enable affordable and high quality access to the internet for all;
- ii. Support education and capacity-building, from literacy to critical thinking and the critical use of ICTs;
- iii. Reinforce the WSIS goals on the value of open content and free and open source software.

Governments should design such policies in consultation with all stakeholders, and partner with them in implementation. Governments should also foster the creation and development of local media, both public and private.

The private sector should invest resources in incorporating the development of local content into their business models (as opposed to using one-size-fits-all strategies regardless of the content). Private sector interventions in policy-making that promote restrictive licensing regimes that further specific business interests at the expense of access to and creation of knowledge should be challenged.

EC at a national and local level requires a clear commitment from governments to cast an eye on local needs and populations, and prioritise access in the fullest sense of the word – beyond use to creation and decision-making – community, bottom-up digital agenda and priority setting, which would include capacity building and working together with communities to resolve local language and content needs. There needs to be recognition of the basic premise that internet belongs to no one, everyone can use it, and everyone can improve it. If this basic premise is “enhanced”, at the national level this would translate into facilitating access for all. If there is a real appropriation of the internet, there will also be improvement and innovation and local language content creation.

#### **15. What are the international internet-related public policy issues that are of special relevance to developing countries?**

- i. Ensuring fair, open, dynamic and competitive markets that stimulates local internet businesses, without resorting to practices that limit consumer choice.
- ii. Network neutrality, and how this complex concept is evolving in the context of increased convergence of internet/telecoms/broadcasting/content/services/applications.
- iii. Policies that maximise the internet's potential for free speech and democratisation.
- iv. Security for all: Security on the internet is needed an important issue, but not the prevailing approach which puts the the security of States, narrowly defined by the security sector, before the security of the internet and of internet users. Journalists, human rights defenders and whistleblowers who expose corruption and the abuse of power cannot be effective if they do not have access to a secure internet.
- v. Ensuring financing is available to address the objectives described above in questions 12 and 14, e.g. by redirecting some of the revenues from gTLD domain name registrations to developing countries to support national and regional internet governance processes, to promote better access to the internet, and to improve capacity building to ensure timely switch-over to IPv6.

**16. What are the key issues to be addressed to promote the affordability of the Internet, in particular in developing countries and least developed countries?**

- i. More effective competition between providers (controls put in place to limit market dominance of incumbent fixed and mobile operators, opening of markets to new players, including lowering of barriers to entry created by high license fees)
- ii. Increased access to radio spectrum for providers and end-users – low costs of spectrum licensing and increased spectrum allocations or permissions for spectrum sharing and use of unlicensed spectrum.
- iii. Deployment of wireless networks optimising the use of the spectrum based on the latest technical developments and an open approach to spectrum management.

**17. What are the national capacities to be developed and modalities to be considered for national governments to develop Internet-related public policy with participation of all stakeholders?**

- i. Political will to work in an inclusive way and manage the change this might require and strong, accountable public-interest oriented regulatory agencies;
- ii. National plans for capacity building and the development of internet governance processes that involve all stakeholders;
- iii. Continuous national mechanisms that are inclusive of all stakeholders where internet governance issues can be dealt with as they emerge;
- iv. Sharing best practice among Country Code Top Level Domain (ccTLD) managers and with others in IG. They have an important role in strengthening national internet governance processes. National capacities should be developed to ensure that ccTLD policies (some of which are of a higher standard than those for generic TLDs) reflect local contexts, especially in developing countries and include diverse CS participation in policy making at national levels. CcTLD managers should foster CS participation in ICANN and other critical internet resource mechanisms which develop and or influence policy including the IGF.

Refer also to other capacities and mechanisms mentioned in response to questions 6, 7 and 8.

**18. Are there other comments, or areas of concern, on EC you would like to submit?**

The Tunis Agenda is a product of a United Nations World Summit on the Information Society. As such, we believe all its intentions, including 'EC', should not be considered from the perspective of 'sovereign nation states', but from the perspective of the common vision for this information society outlined in paragraph 1 of the Geneva Declaration: "We, the representatives of the peoples of the world, assembled in Geneva from 10-12 December 2003 for the first phase of the World Summit on the Information Society, declare our common desire and commitment to build a people-centred, inclusive and development-oriented Information Society, where everyone can create, access, utilize and share information and knowledge, enabling individuals, communities and peoples to achieve their full potential in promoting their sustainable development and improving their quality of life, premised on the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and respecting fully and upholding the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." (paragraph 1, Geneva Declaration)<sup>10</sup>

The internet belongs to no one, everyone can use it, and everyone can improve it. That also applies to its governance.

We wish the Working Group well in its work!

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<sup>10</sup> <http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/geneva/official/dop.html>